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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,

Case No. 18252

vs.
JACK DONALDSON,
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NA:TURE OF CASE
The appellant has appealed from his conviction
for the crime of issuing a check against insufficient funds in violation of 76-20-11, U.C.A. 1953.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was convicted upon a non-jury
trial, the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow presiding.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits the decision of the trial
court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant was tried without jury on 21
March 1963. The evidence disclosed that on 5 March
-1
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1962 the appellant entered the Cash Saver Service
Station in Salt Lake County to purchase gasoline
(R-14, 15). The service station was operated by
Mr. John Wilson ( R-14, 15). 'The appellant purchased a tank of gasoline for his automobile (R-15).
After the tank was filled, the appellant asked Mr.
Wilson if he would take a "check" (R-15), and Mr.
Wilson said he would. 'The 'appellant then wrote out
Exhibit S-1 in the sum of $:25.00. Exhib'it S-1 is 'a
blank check drawn upon the First Security Bank,
Ogden, Utah, Main Branch. The space provided
for the payee was left blank, but both written words
and figures show· the instrument to be made out
for $2'5.00. The instrument was signed by the appellant a's dl'lawer. Mr. Wilson endorsed the instrument on the back and persented the instrument for
collectinn. The purported check was returned to
Mr. Wilson by the bank, which indicated that they
were unable to locate any account for appellant (R.
17). Mr. Wilson indicated that the appellant made·
no request that he hold the instrument, which was
dated 3 March 1962 ( R. 18).
It was further stipulated that no record of an
account for appellant could be found in the main
Ogden Bl'lanch of the First Security Bank during
the time in question, and that the appellant had
made admissions to a Salt Lake County Sheriff
that he had written Exhibit S-1 and that he knew
2
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when he wrote it that he did not have an account at
the bank (R-22).
During the course of the trial, appellant objected to the admission of Exhibit S-1 on the grounds
that no payee was named on the check. The court
admitted the exhibit over appellant's objection.
Based on the above evidence, the trral court entered
a judgment of guilty.
ARGUMEN;T
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EXHIBIT S-1 INTO EVIDENCE SINCE:
A. EXHIBIT S-1 WAS RELEVANT AND MATERIAL TO THE CASE.
B. THE EXHIBIT IS IN FACT A CHE'CK SINCE:
1. IT IS A BEARE'R INSTRUMENT; OR
2. IT WAS PRESENTE'D TO SOMEONE WHO
HAD AUTHORITY TO TREAT IT AS A
CHECK.
C. APPELLANT ATTEMPTED TO NEGOTIATE A
CHECK WHICH IS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE UNDER 76-20~11, U.C.A.
1953, AS AFFECTED BY 76-1-30, U.C.A. 1953.

It is argued by the appellant that the trial
court improperly admitted Exhibit S-1 into evidence. The essence of appellant's contention is that,
since the purported check did not contain a named
payee, it was not a "check" within the meaning of
that term as used in the statute 76-20-11, U.C.A.,
1953 and, therefore, should not have been admitted.
It is submitted that the nature of the appellant's
A.

I
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contention is erroneous in that he confuses the question of admissibility of evidence with the question
of sufficiency of evidence.
Evidence i1s generally admissible if it is relevant or rna terial to the issues of the case and not
otherwise prejudicial. Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed. § 448. Since Exhibit S-1 was identified
as the instrument which the appellant presented
in payment for his gasoline, and was 'an essential
i tern of the corpus of the case, it was directly relevant and material and, therefore, admissible.
Since the appellant has only preserved the issue of the admissibility of Exhibit S-1 on appeal,
the case should be affirmed without considering
whether Exhibit S-1 as written is legally a check.
Appellant contends Exhibit S-1 is not
a "check" within the maning of 76-20-11, U.C.A.
1953, because no payee was designated. He relies
upon two cases, People v. Nickols, 391 Ill. 565, 63
N.E. 2d 759 ( 1945) and State v. Ivey, 248 N.C. 316,
103 S.E.2d 3'9'8 (19'58), and apparently concludes
that these are the only cases applicable and that they
are contrary to the position that an instrument like
S-1 could be a check. As will be shown, these two
cases are a distinct numerical minority if they, in
fact, stand for the proposition urged, and actually
not truly supportive of the position urged.
In People v. Nickols, supra, the defendant was
B.-1.
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charged by indictment with having forged a check
payable to "Harry E. Crow"; however the check
\vhich was set out in the indictment showed no payee.
The court held the indictment fatal, noting:
"After alleging in the purport clause of
the indictment that the instrument forged
purported to be a check payable to Harry E.
Crow, the tenor clause shows that it was not
a check at all, and that it did not purport
to be a check payable to Harry E. Crow. It
was not necessary, of course, that the indictment describe the instrument both by its purport and by its tenor, yet where it attempts
to do so, the two descriptions must be consistent and it must appear from the face of
the indictment that they refer to the same
instrument. * * *"
"It is apparent, therefore, that there is
a fatal variance between the purport clause
and the tenor clause of the indictment, in the
description of the instrument alleged to have
been forged. * * *"

1

The court did not purport to hold that a check
where the payee has been left blank is not in fact
a check, although some unreasoned and unsupported
dicta in the case support such an inference. Consequently, the holding of the Nickols case does not
truly support the appellant's contention.
In State v. lvey, supra, also relied upon by appellant, the defendant was charged with "giving"
a worthless check. The court in no part of its decision says that an instrument may not be a check
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where the payee is left blank. To the contr.a.ry, the
court had before it a document already showing a
payee. However, defendant contended that he signed
a blank instrument and "did not authorize" anyone to fill it in. The court reversed because of an
instructional error by the trial court as to the effect
of signing a bllank check, where the defendant did
not authorize its completion or intend it as a check.
Consequently, neither case is really precedent on
the proposition for which it is urged.
In the instant case, the appellant delivered
what he called a "check", and which was complete
in all parts except no specific payee was named. It
is submitted that this is a bearer instrument. 44-110, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"An instrument is pa.yable to bearer:
"1. When it is expressed to be so payable; or,

* * *"
The appellant apparently feels this requires
that the instrument actually contain the word
"bearer" before it is so expressed. As will be seen,
this is too narrow a construction. Any expression
which is sufficient to indicate that the drawer intended an unrestricted payee is sufficient. This can
be done in several ways, some of which are common.
First, by writing "cash," State v. Simon, 269 S.W.
95 (Tex. Cr. 1925) ; secondly, by writing "blank"
6
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or merely leaving a blank; or, third, by writing
".John Doe" or "holder". Numerous possibilities
exist. To hold that 44-1-10, U.C.A. 1953, required
a specific bearer expression would be contrary to
accepted commercial practice, provide an easy means
to avoid criminallia:bility for worthless checks, and
finally would render as surplusage the language in
subsection 2. of 44-1-10, U.C.A. 1953, which provides that an instrument is payable to bearer:

"* • •
2. When it is payable to a person named
therein or to bearer."
Finally, the case law and authorities are squarely to the contrary. In 8 Corpus Juris, § '287, p. 170,
it is noted:
''The payee's name may be left blank,
which m'akes the instrument payable in effect
to bearer, and in su~h case the blank may be
filled in by the holder."
A similar statement is found in 10 C.J.S.,
Bills and Notes, § 120, with additional citations. In
Finleyv. Rose, 189 Ky. 359,224 S.W.1059 (1920),
the Kentucky Court of Appeals remarked:
uThe rule is well settled that the name
of the payee may be left blank, which makes
the instrument payable to bearer. * * *"
Many other cases, civil in nature, have so held.
Enid Bank and Trust Co. v. Yandell, 56 P.2d 835
(Okla. 1936); Schuster v. Bown, 97 Cal. App.2d
7
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803, 218 P.2d 836; Li Rocchi v. Kee?'b, 127 So.2d 44
(La. App.); Steel v. Rathbun, 42 Fed. 390 (1890);
Dunham v. Clogg, 30 Md. 284; Dinsmore v. Duncan,
47 N.Y. 573, 15 Am. Rep. 534; Fretwell v. Carter,
78 S.C. 531, 59 S.E. 639; Wookey v. Pole, (Eng.)
Reprint 839. Britton, Bills and Notes, 2nd Eel.. p.
196, notes:
"* * * Formerly, the holder was required to
fill in his name as a condition precedent to
his right to sue upon the instrument but he
may now declare upon such an incomplete
instrument as one payable to bearer."
Since the rule is well settled civilly, the appellant would only be en ti tied to relief if there were
some overriding reasons in the criminal law for not
following the civil rule. Since both civil and criminal law are aimed at commercial protection in this
area, the criminal rule is the same as the civil rule
noted ·above.
In People v. Gorham, 9 Cal. App. 341, 99 Pac.
391 (1908), the defendant g.ave a check in payment
for a piano, but left the payee's name blank. The
company filled in the blank, but before further
negotiation determined the check to be fl'!audulent.
The defendant appealed her conviction on the ground
that the check 1at the time of delivery did not contain the name of a payee, and hence could not be
"a check or other document within the meaning of
section 476" of the California Penal Code. The California Court rejected the contention, noting:
8
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The effect of such paper until the name
of the payee is inserted pursuant to the authority conferred upon the receiver by its delivery for value is that it is payable to the
bearer and passes from hand to hand by mere
delivct·y. Under our view there is no merit
in appellant's contention."
In Harding v. State, '54 Indiana 359 (1876),
the appellant was charged with forgery where the
alleged forged note did not contain the name of a
payee. The Indi~ana Court rejected the contention
now n1ade by appellant and affirmed the conviction,
noting:
ld:

•

•

"But if there should be a blank space left for
the nan1e of the payee, in a written instrument
\Vhich has all the other requisites of a promissory note, such an instrument may well he
termed a promissory note, even in an indictment for forgery of such instrument."
In State v. Campbell, 219 P.2d 956 (Idaho
1950), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed a con,·iction where the payee's name had been left blank.
The court ruled:
"The check in question was in blank as
to the name of the payee. Appellant therefore
contends that it was not a completed check
and did not fall within the statute. In People
v. Gorham, 9 Cal. App. 341, 99 P. 391, the
court decided a similar question contrary to
appellant's contention. The gist of the court's
decision as contained in Headnote No.1, reads
as follows: 'Leaving blank the name of the
payee of a check gives to any bona fide holder
9
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for value implied authority to fill the blank
with his own name or that of a third person,
and so, likewise, where all that was required
to m1ake a check out of a forged instrument
delivered by defendant in payment was the
insertion of the name of the payee, the delivery constituted the transferee defendant's
agent with authority to fill in the blank with
its own name ; and a claim that the instrument was not a check or an instrument for
the payment of money within the meaning of
Pen. Code, § 476, when passed by defendant,
is without merit.'
"A check made payable in bLank is payable to bearer and the blank may be filled in
by the holder. Enid Bank & Trust Co. v. Yandell, 176 Okl. 550, 56 P.2d 835; Clark v. Layman, 144 Kan. 711, 62 P.2d 89'7. Appellant's
contention is without merit."
In Simon v. State, 269 S. W. 95 (Tex. Cr. App.
1925) , the defendant was charged with forgery of
a check. In affirming, the court, by way of dicta,
stated:
"A check, although the name of the payee
is left bl1ank, may be the subject of forgery,
because, if genuine and delivered in such condition, it carries with it authority for the
holder to write in the name of the party e~
titled to receive the money called for by It.
* * * Also an instrument payable only to bear·
er is the subject of forgery."
In Sfctte v. Grider, 284 P.2d 400 (Wyo. 1955),
the Wyoming Supreme Court reached a similar con·
clus'ion, ruling that the delivery of a promissory note
10
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with the payee's name left blank was still the subject of forgery. The court relied upon People v.
Gorham, supra, and stated :
"• • • The fact that the California case involved a check and the case at bar involves a
promissory note does not, in our judgment,
n1ake .any difference. The principle involved
is the same. The objection in this connection
therefore must be overruled."
Consequently, it appears clear that the weight
of authority considering similar situations woul'd
affirm the instant conviction and rule S-1 to be a
bearer instrument.
B.-2. Section 44-1-15, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"Where an instrument is wanting in any
material particular the person in possession
thereof has prima facie authority to complete
it by filling up the 'blanks therein. And a signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the signature in order that the
paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument operates as prima facie authority to
fill it up as such for any amount. * * *"
This court has recognlized the right of one receiving a negotiable instrument to fill in appropriate blanks. Plesc·ia v. Humphries, 121 Utah 355,
2-!1 P.2d 1124 ( 1952). Recently in Hanson v. Beehive Scc1u·ity Co., 14 Utah 2d .... , 380 P.2d 66
( 1963), this court recognized the power of a person
to whom a deed is given, with the name of the
, grantee left blank, to fill in the blank. The court
11
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was clear to point out that such an instrument was
not void. By the same reasoning, it appears clear
that where one makes out a check, leaving the name
of the payee blank, the instrument is not void but
still a check. Especially is this so where the Legislature has granted the recipient authority to complete the instrument. Consequently, at the time that
S-1 was made out it was sufficiently complete to
constitute a check within the meaning of 76-20-11,
U.C.A. 1953. People v. Gorham, 9 Cal. App. 341,
99 Pac. 391 ( 1908) ; State v. Grider, 284 P.2d 400
(Wyo. 1955).
1

Finally, it is submitted that even were the
allegations of the appellant correct, his conduct
would amount to an "attempt" to violate 76-20-11,
U.C.A. 1953, and that this court could modify the
judgment of the trial court to affirm ~a conviction
for attempt and remand for sentence.< 1 >
C.

76-1-30, U.C.A. 1953, defines an attempt as:

"Any act done with intent to commit a
crime, and tending but railing to effect its
commission, is an attempt to commit a crime.

* * *"
In the instant case the appellant represented
to Mr. John Wilson that he was giving him a check
(1)

77-42-3, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
..The court may reverse, affirm or modify the judgment or
Ol'der appealed from, and may set aside, affirm or modify any or
all the proceedings subsequent to or dependent upon such judgment
or order, and may, if proper, order a new trial."

....
1
·~
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(R-15). He in effect attempted to pass a ch~ck. His
failure, if any, would be only the failure to fill in the
name of the payee or for Mr. Wilson to complete the
payee's name. Neither failure is such a failure 1as
would render the crime impossible of commission, and
his conduct would consequently constitute an attempt
to commit the crime. 76-1-30, U.C.A. 1953; State v.
Prince, 75 Utah 205, 284 Pac. 108 ( 1930) ; Model
Penal Code, § 5.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
Since an 'attempt to commit a crime is necessarily
lesser included in the crime itself, State v. Blythe, 20
Utah 378, 58 Pac. 1108 (1899), it would be proper
to affirm a conviction for attempt.
CONCLUSION
The appellant has claimed a defense, which when
examined against the reasoning of other courts and
the general rules of commercial law, affords him no
basis for reversal. It is a common commercial practice for checks to be written leaving a blank for the
payee. Some companies prefer to name themselves as
payee or a specific account; others prefer to give the
instrument as wide a construction as possible and,
therefore, treat a blank instrument as payable to
bearer. Banks obviously operate under the same assumption, as can be seen by the many civil cases so
. holding. To rule to the contrary would not only be a
1
minority position, but would do manifest injury to
13
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commerce. Consequently, the conviction should be af~
firmed.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
~~
RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General·.~~. ·
State Capitol Building
:.,
Salt Lake City, Utah
":

Attorne-ys for Respondent

·
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